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Abstract
Following recent court rulings, cross-border loss compensation for multinational
firms will likely be introduced, at least in Europe. This paper analyzes the effects
of introducing a coordinated cross-border tax relief in a setting where multina-
tional firms choose the size of a risky investment and host countries endogenously
choose tax rates. We show that coordinated cross-border loss compensation is
likely to intensify tax competition when, following current international practice,
the parent firm’s home country bases the tax rebate for a loss-making subsidiary
on its own tax rate. In equilibrium, tax revenue losses will then be even higher
than is implied by the direct effect of the reform. In contrast, tax competition
will be mitigated when the home country bases its loss relief on the tax rate in
the subsidiary’s host country.
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1 Introduction
Tax systems around the world include a fundamental asymmetry in the treatment
of positive and negative corporate incomes. Whereas positive profits are immediately
taxed, the tax value of a loss is not refunded when the loss is incurred, but it can only
be offset against positive incomes. This can either occur over time, usually in the form
of tax loss carryforwards, or by setting off losses in one business line against positive
profits in others within the same company or corporate group. However, in many cases
firms are unable to use these loss offset opportunities. This asymmetry has long been
known to cause important, negative effects on the investment and risk-taking decisions
of firms (Altshuler and Auerbach, 1990; Devereux et al., 1994). Moreover, recent studies
for the United States (Auerbach, 2007) and Europe (Fuest et al., 2007) show that the
problem of unused tax losses is quantitatively a highly important one.1
In an international tax setting, there is another fundamental asymmetry. The national
tax laws of most countries include provisions of ‘group taxation’ that allow losses in
one entity of a corporate group to be offset against the profits made by another, legally
independent entity of the same group. This provision, however, applies only when
the parent and the subsidiary are resident companies of the same tax jurisdiction. In
contrast, a cross-border loss offset between entities of a multinational corporation that
reside in different countries is possible only in exceptional cases.2
The different loss offset rules for multinational as compared to national corporate
groups constitute an obvious discrimination against international investments. This
is a particularly important issue in the European Union, as it seems to run counter to
the freedom of establishment in the internal market. In 2005, a ruling of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of the U.K. based trade firm Marks and Spencer
has therefore received widespread attention. In this case the ECJ decided that a parent
company should not be prevented from deducting the losses of its subsidiary in another
EU member state, if all loss offset possibilities in the host country of the subsidiary
have been exhausted and the losses in the host country are therefore ‘final losses’.3
1Auerbach (2007, Table 4), for example, documents that U.S. corporations reported annual losses
of 350-400 billion USD in aggregate in each of the years 2001-2003, representing roughly two thirds of
positive corporate profits in the same years.
2In the European Union, for example, only four member states out of 27 (Austria, Denmark, France
and Italy) apply tax schemes that permit a cross-border loss offset. See European Commission (2006).
3Nevertheless the ECJ permitted the U.K. government to deny the parent company of Marks and
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Since the ECJ’s initial ruling in the Marks and Spencer case, the issue of what con-
stitutes a ‘final loss’ that qualifies for cross-border loss relief has been the subject of
several further decisions by national courts and the ECJ (see Boulogne and Slavnic,
2012). While the issue is still not fully solved, it is very likely that EU member states
will be legally obliged to offer some form of cross-border tax relief to multinational
businesses. In the wake of the Marks and Spencer ruling, the European Commission
has presented alternative measures for providing a coordinated cross-border loss relief,
which differ primarily in whether the loss transfer from the subsidiary to the parent
country would be temporary or definitive (see European Commission, 2006). Moreover,
a full cross-border loss offset would be a direct implication of introducing a common
consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) in the European Union, which has recently
been proposed by the European Commission (2011).
Despite its immediate policy relevance, the introduction of a coordinated scheme of
cross-border loss compensation has so far received only very little attention in formal
theoretical analyses. In this paper we contribute to filling this gap. A particular focus
of our analysis lies on the question of how the introduction of a coordinated form of
cross-border loss offset will affect corporate tax competition in Europe. Corporate tax
rates have fallen around the world, but the reduction has been particularly strong in
Europe. Between 1995 and 2011, statutory corporate tax rates fell from 35% to 23% in
the average of the EU-27 countries, and thus substantially more than in the non-EU
member states of the OECD (see Eurostat 2011, Tables II-4.1 and II-4.2). Moreover,
recent empirical work confirms the existence of strategic interaction in corporate tax
setting among OECD countries in general, but in particular among the member states
of the European Union (Devereux et al. 2008; Davies and Voget, 2008).
The European Commission has also made it very clear that the introduction of cross-
border loss compensation will not be accompanied by corporate tax rate harmonization
in the EU. Therefore, it is a central question whether, and how, the incentives for tax
competition in Europe would be changed by this reform.
To study the effects of cross-border loss offset on international tax competition, we
set up a symmetric two-country framework where two representative multinational
enterprises (MNEs) choose both the size of a risky investment project and a transfer
Spencer to deduct the losses incurred by its subsidiaries in Belgium, France and Germany from its
positive taxable profits in the United Kingdom, because it did not consider the subsidiaries’ losses to
be ‘final’. See Lang (2006) for a critical discussion of the ECJ’s line of argument.
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price that allows each firm to shift profits between its headquarter and the subsidiary,
located in different countries. Our analysis is based on current international tax rules,
known as ‘separate accounting’, where the parent and the subsidiary of a multinational
firm are taxed as independent entities. On the one hand, our model thus captures
the positive effects of coordinated measures of cross-border loss compensation on the
investment incentives for multinational firms. On the other hand, we incorporate tax
competition by modeling two countries that non-cooperatively set their tax rates in
order to attract the profits of MNEs.
In our benchmark scenario, we assume that the parent country of the MNE bases
the tax rebate to the loss-making subsidiary on its own, home country tax rate. This
corresponds to the current practice in those countries that offer a unilateral cross-border
loss offset to resident MNEs (see footnote 2). Moreover, this scheme also underlies the
European Commission’s proposals for a coordinated cross-border tax relief. We show
that when this scheme is applied, an increase in loss offset opportunities is likely to lead
to falling tax rates in equilibrium, and hence to intensified tax competition, at least
when loss offset is almost complete in equilibrium. The fall in equilibrium tax rates will
in turn cause tax revenue losses for each country to be even larger than is implied by
the direct effect of the reform. The reason underlying this result is simple: maintaining
a high corporate tax rate becomes more costly under cross-border loss compensation,
because it induces a higher tax rebate to loss-making subsidiaries of resident MNEs.
We then show that the negative side effects of cross-border loss compensation can be
avoided under an alternative loss offset scheme where tax rebates are based on the tax
rate in the subsidiary’s host country. In contrast to the benchmark loss offset scheme,
equilibrium tax rates will rise in this scenario following the reform. This is because an
increase in each country’s own tax rate is not accompanied by higher tax rebates to
loss-making subsidiaries, but more generous loss offset provisions increase investment
and thus the corporate tax base. As a result, tax revenue losses will be smaller under
this alternative scheme than is implied by the direct effect of enhanced cross-border
loss compensation.
We analyze the robustness of our results by considering alternative government objec-
tive functions, an endogenous risk choice by the MNEs, and asymmetries between the
competing countries. These analyses show that the advantages of the alternative loss
offset scheme are maintained in most of the extended settings. We conclude, therefore,
that if cross-border loss compensation is introduced in the European Union - either
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because of its economic advantages, or to satisfy legal non-discrimination rules - the
cross-border tax relief should be based on the tax rate of the country in which the losses
occur (the host country) . If instead, current plans are realized and the tax rebate is
based on the tax rate of the country granting the tax relief (the home country), then it
must be expected that the introduction of cross-border tax relief will further fuel the
ongoing tax competition in Europe.
In the related literature, most theoretical and empirical studies have analyzed the effects
of incomplete loss compensation in a closed economy setting. Theoretical analyses have
focused mostly on the effects on investment and risk-taking decisions over time (e.g.
Eeckhoudt et al., 1997; Pantheghini, 2001). The empirical literature has estimated
the response of investment decisions to tax law asymmetries in the United States
(Altshuler and Auerbach, 1990) and in the United Kingdom (Devereux et al., 1994).
In general, these studies have found significant negative investment effects of imperfect
loss compensation. More recently, these effects have been reassessed using more detailed
empirical models and richer data sources (Edgerton, 2010; Dwenger and Walch, 2011).
In recent years, a few papers have analyzed loss offset in an international setting, but
this literature is still very small. Among the empirical studies, Niemann and Treisch
(2005) perform a Monte Carlo simulation analysis of the unilateral introduction of
cross-border loss compensation in Austria (see footnote 2). Fuest et al. (2007) estimate
the tax revenue effects of a switch to a complete cross-border loss offset under the
CCCTB and find that, in the EU average, the corporate tax base falls by 20% as a
result of this change. Dressler and Overesch (2013) analyze the impact of national loss
offset regimes on MNEs’ investment decisions and find mixed empirical support for the
claim that generous loss offset provisions increase foreign direct investment.
Little is known, however, about how the introduction of cross-border loss offset shapes
national corporate tax policies in a setting of international tax competition. Ge´rard
and Weiner (2003, 2006) study this issue in a framework where MNEs are taxed under
formulary apportionment, but they do not derive the full equilibrium changes in tax
rates that follow from the reform. Closest to our paper is Kalamov and Runkel (2012),
who derive the non-cooperative equilibrium when countries compete over both tax rates
and the rate of cross-border loss offset. Their analysis is based on a setting where each
country grants cross-border tax relief based on its own tax rate. The authors find that
decentralized loss offset provisions are set efficiently when countries compete for real
investment, whereas individual countries choose inefficiently high levels of cross-border
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loss offset when they compete for profit shifting. The analysis of Kalamov and Runkel
is thus complementary to ours, as we focus on the coordinated introduction of cross-
border loss relief and study how this affects tax rate competition under two alternative
loss offset regimes.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework for our
analysis. Section 3 analyzes the effects of cross-border loss offset under the benchmark
scheme, where the tax rebate is based on the tax rate in the parent’s home country.
Section 4 carries out the same analysis under the alternative loss offset scheme, where
the tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country is used for the tax rebate. Section 5
analyzes several extensions of our basic model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic framework
We consider a simple one-period model of two small countries, labeled 1 and 2. There
are two representative MNEs, each with a parent company in one country and with
a subsidiary in the other country. We label firm i ∈ {1, 2} by the country in which
the parent is located. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile internationally and is
supplied to the firms by the international capital market at an exogenous interest rate
normalized to one. Finally, we assume in our benchmark model that both firms and
countries are perfectly symmetric. This excludes redistributive tax revenue effects that
arise from tax rate differentials in a setting with cross-border loss compensation. Hence
our benchmark model focuses squarely on the efficiency of firms’ investment choices
and governments’ tax policies. Asymmetries between countries will be introduced in
the extensions (Section 5.3).
The two MNEs produce a homogeneous good for the world market, at a world price
normalized to one. Production occurs with capital and a fixed factor, following the
production function f(ki), with fk > 0 and fkk < 0. Hence pure profits arise from
decreasing returns to scale in production.
Each MNE makes two sets of choices. First, each firm chooses the level of investment ki.
We assume, for simplicity, that this investment choice is made only by the subsidiary
of firm i (which is located in country j). In our benchmark model, the investment is
successful with an exogenous probability p, and unsuccessful with probability 1 − p.4
4In Section 5.2 we allow firms to endogenously choose the success probability of the investment.
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These probabilities are identical for both MNEs. The parent company of each firm has
an exogenous profit income equal to Gi, which is sufficient to cover all possible losses
of the subsidiary.5
Second, each MNE is able to shift profits between the headquarter and the subsidiary,
in order to save taxes. The simplest way to model this is through manipulated transfer
prices.6 Hence we assume that the headquarter provides an overhead service to the
subsidiary, whose true value is normalized to zero for analytical convenience. Declaring
a manipulated transfer price qi > 0 will therefore shift profits from the subsidiary
to the headquarter country, whereas a transfer price qi < 0 does the reverse. Profit
shifting imposes costs for legal counseling or expected fines that are assumed to be
quadratic in the deviation from the true value of the overhead service and are given
by C(qi) = bq
2
i /2. The MNEs behave in a risk-neutral way and maximize their net
expected payoff.
Corporate income taxes are modeled as proportional taxes on profits. We assume that
taxes are imposed by the source country of the investment.7 This implies that country j
taxes the profits of the subsidiary of firm i, whereas the parent country of this firm, i,
exempts this income from tax. Moreover, our analysis focuses on the effects that cross-
border loss offset introduces under the current principle of separate accounting, where
the parent and the subsidiary of a multinational firm are taxed as separate entities.8
5Alternatively, we could assume that the parent company of each MNE takes the same decisions
as the subsidiary. This, however, would reduplicate the decisions taken within each MNE, increasing
the complexity of the analysis without adding additional insights.
6An alternative channel for profit shifting that has attracted much recent interest is debt shifting
within the multinational firm (see Schindler and Schjelderup, 2012 for a theoretical analysis and Egger
et al., 2010, for empirical evidence). Modeling debt shifting is slightly more complex than the modeling
of strategic transfer price setting, however, and the implications for tax competition between countries,
on which the present analysis is focused, are identical.
7The source principle of taxation, where the profits of a subsidiary are tax-exempt in the country
of the parent firm, is followed by the overwhelming majority of OECD countries. One of the few
exceptions is the United States which is, however, also contemplating a switch to the exemption
method. See Becker and Fuest (2010) for a recent discussion and analysis.
8In contrast, Ge´rard and Weiner (2003, 2006) base their analysis of cross-border loss offset on
a system of formulary apportionment, where the total profits of a MNE are aggregated and then
allocated to the various host countries according to a predetermined formula. It is well-known that
the tax incentives for national governments can be very different under separate accounting and under
formulary apportionment (see e.g. Riedel and Runkel, 2007).
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The essential element of our model is cross-border loss offset within the MNE. In our
static model, losses incurred in one country cannot be offset against positive future
profits in the same country. Hence the one-period model highlights the role of cross-
border loss offset by effectively turning all losses incurred in one country into ‘final
losses’ (see the introduction). Specifically, we postulate that if the investment project
of firm i’s subsidiary is unsuccessful, then a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the losses can be
deducted from the exogenous taxable profit income of the parent firm in country i.
Our analysis thus focuses on a setting where the losses of a subsidiary can be deducted
from positive profits made by the parent company. In practice this is the setting in
which cross-border loss offset is most likely to be introduced, because it minimizes the
possibility that the MNE can abuse loss offset provisions.9
3 Benchmark: Loss offset at the home country’s tax
In this section, we analyze the implications of cross-border loss-offset in the bench-
mark case where the MNE’s home country bases the tax rebate granted for the losses
of foreign subsidiaries on its own tax rate. This scheme is currently applied by the coun-
tries that offer a unilateral cross-border loss offset and it also underlies the European
Commission’s proposals for the coordinated introduction of cross-border tax relief.
3.1 Firms
Given the corporate tax rates ti and tj, the expected after-tax profits of the multina-
tional firm based in country i are
E(pii) = (1− ti)[Gi + qi] + (1− tj){p[f(ki)− ki]− qi} − (1− αti)(1− p)ki − b
2
q2i , (1)
for i 6= j. In (1) the first term describes the exogenous profits of the parent company,
plus any ‘paper profits’ shifted to this country, net of the tax rate applied in the parent
firm’s home country i. The second term captures the net profits of firm i’s subsidiary
9If a parent company’s losses can be deducted from the profits of a subsidiary, then the MNE will
often have a choice in which country to offset the losses. If the tax rebate is based on the tax rate
in the country granting the tax relief, the MNE has an incentive to offset the parent’s losses in the
host country with the highest tax rate. For this reason, there is considerable skepticism against a
‘downward’ cross-border tax relief, in contrast to the ‘upward’ tax relief that we consider here. See
European Commission (2006).
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in country j in the case where the investment is successful, again corrected for profit
shifting. Investment is assumed to fully depreciate in the process of production so
that investment costs must be deducted from the value of output. The third term
captures the losses incurred by the subsidiary when the investment is unsuccessful,
which occurs with probability (1 − p). In this case the value of output is zero and
the before-tax loss is simply ki. This loss is reduced by the tax relief granted in the
parent’s home country i, where the tax credit depends on country i’s tax rate and on
the internationally coordinated loss offset factor α. Finally, the last term gives the cost
of profit shifting, which are assumed to be not deductible from tax.
Maximizing (1) with respect to ki implicitly defines the subsidiary’s optimal investment
level by
fki − 1−
(1− p)
p(1− tj) (1− αti) = 0 ∀ i 6= j. (2)
In the absence of uncertainty (p = 1), the third term on the left-hand side of (2) is
zero and the optimal investment level is implicitly determined by the usual condition
that the marginal product of capital, fk, equals the exogenous world interest rate
of unity. In the presence of uncertainty, but in the absence of taxes, the marginal
productivity of capital in case of success must rise by (1−p)/p, in order to compensate
the risk-neutral investor for the possibility of failure. This decision is distorted by a
tax system that taxes positive profits but grants no tax relief for losses incurred. If
no cross-border loss offset occurs at all (α = 0), the marginal product of capital must
rise by (1 − p)/[p(1 − tj)]. This implies an underinvestment by the subsidiary that
is the more severe, the higher is country j’s tax rate. Introducing cross-border loss
offset counteracts this distortion, but it will only fully eliminate it when the loss offset
parameter α equals one and tax rates in both countries are identical.
The MNEs optimality condition with respect to the transfer price qi is given by
qi =
tj − ti
b
∀ i 6= j. (3)
Setting qi > 0, that is shifting profits from the subsidiary in country j to the parent in
country i, will thus be profitable to the extent that tj > ti.
From (2) and (3) the effects of taxes on the firm’s optimal choices of ki and qi are:
∂ki
∂ti
= − α(1− p)
p(1− tj)fkiki
≥ 0, ∂ki
∂tj
=
(1− αti)(1− p)
p(1− tj)2fkiki
< 0, (4)
∂qi
∂ti
=
−1
b
< 0,
∂qi
∂tj
=
1
b
> 0. (5)
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Equation (4) shows that an increase in country j’s tax rate leads to less capital invest-
ment by the subsidiary of firm i.10 In contrast, by increasing the expected tax rebate,
an increase in the tax rate of country i increases capital investment by firm i’s sub-
sidiary when the loss offset parameter α is strictly positive. Equation (5) states that a
tax increase in either country leads to profits being shifted to the other country.
3.2 Governments
In our benchmark model, we postulate that governments maximize their corporate
tax revenues. This objective captures the concern about tax revenues that features
prominently in both policy debates and court decisions on cross-border loss offset. From
a theoretical perspective, the assumption that the profit income of MNEs does not enter
the governments’ objective function corresponds to a setting where the residents of each
country invest their capital in perfectly diversified global portfolios.11 The implications
of an extended government objective that also incorporates the profits of home-based
multinationals are considered in Section 5.1.
Country i’s tax base consists of the exogenous profit income Gi, less the share α of
the losses made by the subsidiary of firm i if its investment fails. To these are added
the profits made by the subsidiary of firm j when this firm’s investment is successful.
Finally, tax revenues are affected by the net effect of profit shifting in both MNEs. Tax
revenues in each country are then given by
Ti = ti{Gi − α(1− p)ki + p[f(kj)− kj] + qi − qj} ≡ tiBi ∀ i 6= j. (6)
The possibility to attract profits from both MNEs thus gives rise to tax competition
between the two countries. As in all models of symmetric tax competition, the possibility
of profit shifting by MNEs suffices to constrain non-cooperating countries in the setting
of their optimal tax rates, even if no profit shifting actually occurs in equilibrium.
Maximizing with respect to ti gives country i’s optimal tax rate in implicit form:
t∗i =
Bi
−Ωi > 0 ∀ i, (7)
10Recall that the subscript i refers to the headquarter country of multinational i, but the subsidiary’s
investment occurs in country j. Therefore the well-known negative effect of source-based taxes on
investment is given by ∂ki/∂tj in our notation.
11Empirically, globally diversified portfolios are a plausible scenario when most of the small country’s
capital is invested through financial intermediaries, such as pension funds or insurance companies.
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where the profit tax base Bi is given in (6) and
Ωi ≡
[
p(fkj − 1)
∂kj
∂ti
− α(1− p) ∂ki
∂ti
+
∂qi
∂ti
− ∂qj
∂ti
]
< 0 (8)
collects the sum of effects that an increase in ti has on country i’s tax base via the
investment decisions (the first two terms in the squared bracket) and the profit-shifting
decisions (the last two terms) of both representative MNEs. From (4) and (5), these
effects are all negative. The optimal tax policy thus follows a straightforward inverse
elasticity rule: it rises with the total value of country i’s tax base Bi, but falls in the
aggregate response of the tax base to a tax increase in country i.
3.3 The effects of cross-border loss offset
The core question of our analysis is how a coordinated increase in the loss offset pa-
rameter α affects optimal tax rates and equilibrium tax revenues. To determine the
effects on optimal tax rates, differentiating (7) with respect to α yields
dt∗i
dα
=
1
−Ωi
∂Bi
∂α
+
Bi
Ω2i
∂Ωi
∂α
. (9)
The first term in (9) gives the change in country i’s tax base following an increase
in the loss offset parameter α. To sign this effect we derive the impact effects of a
change in α on ki.
12 Implicitly differentiating (2) shows that increased cross-border
loss compensation raises investment by both subsidiaries:
∂ki
∂α
= − ti(1− p)
(1− tj)pfkiki
> 0 ∀ i 6= j. (10)
When countries are symmetric, the change in country i’s tax base following an increase
in α is given by
∂Bi
∂α
= −(1− p)k − (1− α) t(1− p)
2
(1− t)2pfkk . (11)
The first term in (11) gives the negative, direct effect on country i’s tax base that
results from the increased tax rebate to the loss-making subsidiary of its MNE. The
second term captures the indirect effects through the induced change in the MNEs’
investment behavior. The expansion of risky activities in firm i’s subsidiary reduces
country i’s expected tax base, because the government of country i participates only
12By impact effect we mean the direct effect of the exogenous parameter change, without taking
into account the induced changes in governments’ tax policies.
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in the losses, but not in the profits of this subsidiary. Matters are exactly reversed for
the subsidiary of firm j, where country i taxes the increased profits in case of success,
but does not share in the losses if the investment fails.
In general, it is therefore not possible to sign the change in country i’s tax base that
results from an increase in α. The net effect can be signed, however, when cross-border
loss compensation is almost complete and α→ 1. In this case, the indirect effects in (11)
sum to zero. Intuitively, with full loss offset, the firm’s optimal investment condition
implies that the expected increase in the tax base from a successful investment of
subsidiary j is exactly offset by the expected loss of an unsuccessful investment of
subsidiary i. Hence only the negative direct effect remains, giving
∂Bi
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α→1
= −(1− p)k < 0. (12)
In the following we will also refer to this direct effect as the mechanical effect of the
reform.
Next, we analyze the effect of improved loss offset opportunities on the elasticity of
country i’s tax base, as given by Ωi. To differentiate (8) with respect to α, we use the
first-order condition for capital investment (2) and the impact effect of cross-border
loss offset on capital investment (10). Further differentiating the tax sensitivities of
capital investments in (4) with respect to α gives
∂Ωi
∂α
=
2(1− p)2
(1− t)3pfkk [α− t− 2αt(1− t)] . (13)
The sign of (13) is ambiguous, in general. However, when loss offset is almost complete
(α → 1) and the tax rate is not too high (t < 0.5), it is straightforward to show that
the sign of (13) is negative, implying that a rise in ti leads to a larger tax base loss
when cross-border loss offset is improved. Using this result along with (12) in (9) gives
the result that improved loss offset conditions will reduce equilibrium tax rates in both
countries. This is summarized in:
Proposition 1a Consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium in tax rates where govern-
ments maximize tax revenues and the losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax rate
of the parent’s home country. Then a small increase in cross-border loss offset dα > 0
reduces equilibrium tax rates in both countries, if loss offset is almost complete (α→ 1)
and tax rates are not too high initially (t ≤ 1/2).
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Proposition 1a points to an important and, as yet, little studied side effect of co-
ordinated arrangements to increase cross-border tax relief. Given that governments
remain free to set profit tax rates non-cooperatively, improving the international tax
deductibility of losses is likely to make international tax competition more aggressive.
The reason is that cross-border loss offset increases the costs of maintaining a high tax
rate, when each country grants an international loss offset based on its own tax rate.
This effect is the stronger the higher is the degree of loss offset α.
We now derive the equilibrium change in tax revenues following an increase in α.
Writing Ti = Ti[α, ti(α), tj(α)] and differentiating with respect to α gives
13
dTi
dα
=
∂Ti
∂α
+
∂Ti
∂tj
dtj
dα
. (14)
The first term in (14) captures the direct effect of α on the tax base, and hence tax
revenues, for constant tax rates ti. From (11) and (2) this effect can be expressed as
∂Ti
∂α
= t
[
−(1− p)k + (1− p)(1− α)
(1− t)
∂k
∂α
]
. (15)
The first effect in the squared bracket is again the direct or mechanical effect of the
reform, which is now valued with country i’s tax rate. The second term gives the net
change in country i’s tax revenues through the behavioral responses of both subsidiaries.
In case of success, tax revenues increase with an investment expansion of firm j, but
decrease with a higher investment of firm i. The net effect will be positive as long as
cross-border loss offset is incomplete. We have already shown, however, that the second
effect goes to zero, and the tax base change is unambiguously negative, when α → 1
[see eq. (12)].
To obtain the general equilibrium change in tax revenues, it remains to sign the exter-
nality that the induced tax change in the other country j has on country i’s tax base.
From (6) we can show that country i’s tax base will unambiguously rise following a
tax increase in country j:
∂Ti
∂tj
= 2t
[
1
b
− α(1− p)
2(1− αt)
p(1− t)2fkk
]
> 0. (16)
The first effect in (16) shows that country i’s tax base rises from profit shifting into
the country as a result of the higher tax rate abroad. Secondly, a rise in tj increases
13Note that the effect of country i’s own tax rate on its tax revenues Ti is zero from the envelope
theorem.
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the value of the loss offset that firm j can obtain for any given and positive level of
α. This increases investment by firm j’s subsidiary and thus the tax base of country i.
Lastly, a higher tax rate in country j reduces firm i’s investment there, thus reducing
the volume of tax rebates that country i has to grant its resident MNE.
Hence, the total effect of the externality depends on how equilibrium tax rates change
with increased cross-border loss offset. From Proposition 1a we know that tax rates in
both countries will fall in a symmetric Nash equilibrium when cross-border loss offset
is almost complete and initial tax rates are not too large. In this case the second effect
in (14) is thus negative and adds to the negative first effect. Hence equilibrium tax
revenues in both countries will fall. Moreover, due to the downward adjustment of
tax rates, tax revenue losses in both countries will exceed the revenue losses from the
mechanical effect. We summarize our findings in:
Proposition 1b When the losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax rate of the
parent’s home country, then a small increase in cross-border loss offset dα > 0 lowers
equilibrium tax revenues in each country by more than the mechanical effect, if loss
offset is almost complete (α→ 1) and tax rates are not too high initially (t ≤ 1/2).
Proposition 1b implies that a marginal increase in the degree of cross-country tax
relief to the point of full loss offset is definitely undesirable for revenue-maximizing
governments, as it reduces both the equilibrium tax base and the optimal rate of
corporation tax. Fuest et al. (2007) have isolated the direct tax base effect (mechanical
effect) of switching to a complete cross-border loss offset and have estimated that this
reduces corporate tax revenues in the EU average by roughly 20%. Our analysis shows
that equilibrium tax revenue losses can be expected to be even higher, if the behavioral
responses of firms and governments are taken into account.
4 An alternative loss offset scheme
Our analysis in the previous section has shown that introducing cross-border loss offset
is likely to intensify tax competition when the MNE’s home country bases the tax rebate
for the losses of foreign subsidiaries on its own tax rate. This suggests an alternative
loss offset scheme, where the home country still grants a tax rebate for the losses of
its foreign-based subsidiaries, but applies the tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country
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to the loss offset.14 One immediate advantage of this alternative scheme is that the
same tax rate is applied to both positive and negative returns on investment. In the
following we analyze this scheme in more detail, focussing again on the issue of how
international tax competition is affected by cross-border loss compensation.
4.1 Firms and governments
With the changed specification of loss compensation, the expected after-tax profits of
firm i are given by
E(pii) = (1− ti)[Gi + qi] + (1− tj){p[f(ki)− ki]− qi}− (1− αtj)(1− p)ki− b
2
q2i . (17)
The only difference between (17) and equation (1) in the last section lies in the third
term, where losses are now rebated at the tax rate tj of the subsidiary’s host coun-
try. Optimal profit shifting behavior does not change under the alternative loss offset
scheme, so that equations (3) and (5) from Section 3 continue to apply. Optimal in-
vestment decisions are affected, however, and are now implicitly determined by
fki − 1−
(1− p)
p(1− tj) (1− αtj) = 0 ∀ i 6= j. (18)
Differentiating (18) with respect to the tax rates ti and tj yields
∂k˜i
∂ti
= 0,
∂k˜i
∂tj
=
(1− α)(1− p)
p(1− tj)2fkiki
≤ 0 ∀ i 6= j, (19)
where the tilde indicates that we are now evaluating all effects at the alternative loss
offset scheme. Under this scheme, the tax rate in the parent country i has no effects
on firm i’s choices. This is, of course, a result of our simplifying assumption that the
investment level of the parent company is fixed. At the same time, the tax rate of the
host country j now applies to both positive and negative profits. Eq. (19) shows that
the net effect of tj on the investment level of firm i’s subsidiary is negative when loss
compensation is incomplete. If α = 1, the distortion arising from source-based capital
taxation disappears and the tax tj becomes a lump-sum tax.
As before, the objective of both governments is to maximize tax revenues. When coun-
try i applies the foreign tax rate tj to calculate the tax rebate granted to the subsidiary
of its home-based MNE, its tax revenues are
T˜i = ti{Gi + p[f(k˜j)− k˜j] + q˜i − q˜j} − αtj(1− p)k˜i ≡ tiB˜i − αtj(1− p)k˜i. (20)
14We thank Clemens Fuest for the suggestion to study this alternative loss offset scheme.
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Maximizing with respect to ti gives
t˜∗i =
B˜i
−Ω˜i
> 0, Ω˜i = p(fkj − 1)
∂k˜j
∂ti
+
∂q˜i
∂ti
− ∂q˜j
∂ti
< 0. (21)
Note, from the definition of B˜i in (20), that the tax rebate to the loss-making subsidiary
does not enter the numerator of the optimal tax rate t˜∗i under this loss offset scheme.
4.2 The effects of cross-border loss offset
To analyze the effects of cross-border loss offset, we proceed as in the last section to
determine the effects on optimal tax rates [see eq. (9)]. The impact effect of a change
in α on investment is again unambiguously positive under the alternative loss offset
scheme. An important difference to the analysis in the previous section is, however,
that the loss offset parameter α now affects B˜i only through the investment level of
firm j:
∂k˜j
∂α
= − ti(1− p)
(1− ti)pfkjkj
> 0,
∂B˜i
∂α
= p
(
fkj − 1
) ∂k˜i
∂α
> 0 ∀ i 6= j. (22)
In stark contrast to our previous specification [see eq. (12)], we get the global result
that the numerator of each country’s optimal tax expression is unambiguously rising
in α under the alternative loss offset scheme. Turning to the denominator of t˜∗i in (21),
differentiating with respect to α and using (18) and (19) yields:
∂Ω˜i
∂α
= −(1− p)
2[(1− αti) + ti(1− α)]
p(1− ti)3fkjkj
> 0. (23)
This shows that the elasticity with which country i’s tax base responds to tax changes
in ti is unambiguously falling in α. We thus get
Proposition 2a Consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium in tax rates where govern-
ments maximize tax revenues and losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax rate of
the subsidiary’s host country. Then a small increase in cross-border loss offset dα > 0
increases equilibrium tax rates in both countries for any level of α.
In direct contrast to Proposition 1a in the previous section, Proposition 2a states that
country i’s optimal tax rate is unambiguously and globally rising in α when countries
grant cross-border tax relief at the rate of the subsidiary’s host country. Hence tax
competition is mitigated under the alternative tax relief scheme. The core reason for
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this result is that an increase in the loss offset parameter has no negative direct effect
on optimal tax rates in both countries. At the same time, the induced investment
expansion of both MNEs increases tax bases in both countries and thus offers an
incentive to increase tax rates.
To compute the equilibrium changes in tax revenues, we follow (14) and first consider
the direct effect, ignoring for now the tax rate changes induced by enhanced cross-
border loss offset. The direct effect on tax revenues is:
∂T˜i
∂α
= t˜
[
−(1− p)k˜ + (1− p)(1− α)
(1− t˜)
∂k˜
∂α
]
. (24)
The structure of (24) is analogous to the corresponding direct effect in the previous
section [see eq. (15)]. The negative first term gives the mechanical effect of the reform,
whereas the second term collects the effects on tax revenue via behavioral adjustments.
The second term is positive whenever loss offset is incomplete so that the returns to
higher capital investments are taxed, on net, by the two governments. When α → 1,
however, the second effect goes to zero and only the negative statutory effect remains.
We now turn to the effects of tax competition. The tax externality ∂T˜i/∂tj can be
calculated from government i’s tax revenues by differentiating (20) with respect to tj,
using (5) and (19). This gives:
∂T˜i
∂tj
=
2t˜
b
− t˜ α(1− α)(1− p)
2
p(1− t˜)2fkk
− α(1− p)k˜. (25)
Equation (25) shows three distinct effects that a tax increase in country j has on
tax revenues in country i. The first two effects are analogous to our analysis in the
previous section [see eq. (16)] and are both positive. By the first effect, a tax increase
in country j will lead to profit shifting into country i, irrespective of how tax rebates
are calculated. The second effect is strictly positive for 0 < α < 1, as an increase in tj
reduces the investment of firm i’s subsidiary, and therefore reduces the expected tax
rebate of country i. There is a counteracting third effect in (25), however, which is
specific to tax rebates being based on the tax rate in the subsidiary’s host country:
by raising its tax rate, the host country j can raise the rate at which country i has
to grant tax relief to the subsidiary of its home-based MNE. Taken in isolation, this
effect thus provides an incentive for strategic overtaxation under the alternative loss
offset scheme, as an increase in tj raises the tax applied to a successful project, which
is collected by country j, whereas the simultaneous increase in the tax rebate in the
event of a loss is paid for by the other country i.
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Since we know from Proposition 2a that tax rates are rising in α under the alternative
loss offset regime, the indirect effect on country i’s tax revenues is positive, iff the net
externality in (25) is positive. This will be true, in particular, if α is sufficiently low
initially so that the negative third effect is small. In this case, the increase in tax rates
induced by enhanced cross-border loss offset under the alternative scheme will lead to a
positive indirect effect on each country’s tax revenues. Together with the non-negative
second effect in (24) this ensures that revenue losses are smaller for each country than
is implied by the mechanical effect of the reform. This is summarized in:
Proposition 2b When the losses of subsidiaries are rebated at the tax rate of the
subsidiary’s host country, then a small increase in cross-border loss offset dα > 0
lowers equilibrium tax revenues in each country by less than the mechanical effect, if
the loss offset parameter α is sufficiently low initially.
Comparing Proposition 2b to Proposition 1b in the previous section shows that the
revenue effects of cross-border loss offset are very different under the two loss offset
schemes. The tax revenue losses that arise from the mechanical effect of more generous
loss offset provisions will likely be enlarged by behaviorial effects when parent countries
of MNEs base tax rebates for loss-making subsidiaries on their own tax rate, whereas
revenue losses will be reduced in size when each parent country uses the foreign tax rate
to calculate its tax rebate. These opposite behavioral effects arise from the contrasting
incentives to adjust optimal tax rates that exist under the two loss offset regimes.
Since many of our theoretical results hold strictly only for certain ranges of the loss
offset parameter α, we conclude this section by offering some representative simulation
results that compare the two loss offset schemes. For this purpose we specify the pro-
duction function of both representative firms as f(ki) = φk
0.5
i . We present simulation
results for both a low and a high value of the productivity parameter φ (φ = 4 and
φ = 6, respectively). Moreover, we consider two different intensities of tax competition
for the allocation of profits: a regime of low shifting costs (b = 0.2) and aggressive tax
competition, and a regime of higher shifting costs (b = 0.5) and moderate tax compe-
tition. In each scenario we consider alternative values for the loss offset parameter α.
The results are summarized in Table 1.
For the benchmark scheme, Table 1 shows that tax rates need not monotonically fall,
and may indeed rise in equilibrium as long as the degree of loss offset is low initially. This
is seen in the scenario with high productivity (φ = 6) and moderate tax competition
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Table 1: Tax rate and tax revenue effects of alternative loss offset schemes
benchmark scheme alternative scheme
φ = 4 φ = 6 φ = 4 φ = 6
α ti Ti ti Ti ti Ti ti Ti
b = 0.2 0.0 0.221 0.524 0.327 1.271 0.221 0.524 0.327 1.271
0.1 0.219 0.512 0.324 1.253 0.223 0.523 0.333 1.281
0.5 0.205 0.455 0.306 1.126 0.233 0.516 0.364 1.327
1.0 0.178 0.357 0.250 0.812 0.250 0.500 0.437 1.422
b = 0.5 0.0 0.433 0.947 0.514 1.779 0.433 0.947 0.514 1.779
0.1 0.433 0.946 0.515 1.791 0.441 0.961 0.525 1.814
0.5 0.422 0.910 0.507 1.781 0.484 1.030 0.589 2.002
1.0 0.360 0.719 0.414 1.347 0.625 1.250 1.000 3.250
Notes: G1 = G2 = 1; p = 0.5
(b = 0.5). However, for large initial values of α, tax rates are unambiguously falling
as the degree of loss offset is further increased (Proposition 1a). Tax revenues follow a
similar pattern and may be rising in α when the initial level of cross-border loss offset is
low. For high initial values of α, however, a further rise in α leads to large tax revenue
losses in both countries, which far exceed the mechanical effect (Proposition 1b).15
For the alternative scheme, tax rates are seen to be monotonically rising in α in all sce-
narios (Proposition 2a). Nevertheless, tax revenues may fall as cross-border loss offset
increases, as is seen for the scenario with b = 0.2 and φ = 4. However, the reduction
in tax revenues will be less than the mechanical effect under this loss offset scheme
(Proposition 2b; cf. footnote 15). Hence the fall in tax revenues is far less pronounced
in this case, as compared to the benchmark scheme. In the other three scenarios, the
induced increase in equilibrium tax rates under the alternative loss offset scheme is
even so large that the indirect (behavioral) effects dominate the direct (mechanical)
effect and tax revenues are monotonically rising in α.
15We evaluate the magnitude of the mechanical effect for the scenario with φ = 4 and b = 0.2.
The investment levels ki are then about one. With p = 0.5 and ti ≈ 0.2, the revenue loss from the
mechanical effect is then approximately equal to 0.100 dα under both loss offset schemes [cf. eq. (15)].
For a switch from no to full cross-border loss offset (dα=1), this corresponds to about 20% of initial
tax revenues, comparable to the results in Fuest et al. (2007). The total revenue loss in this case is
(0.524-0.357)/0.524 ≈ 32%, including the effects of reduced tax rates.
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5 Discussion and extensions
In this section we extend our analysis in several directions. In Section 5.1 we modify the
governments’ objective function to account for the profits of home-based multinational
firms. In Section 5.2. we allow firms to endogenously choose the success probability of
their risky investments. These two extensions are introduced only for the benchmark
loss offset scheme, to analyze the robustness of our result that cross-border loss offset
intensifies tax competition under this scheme. Finally, in Section 5.3 we introduce
asymmetries between countries and compare the two alternative loss offset schemes in
a setting where redistributive effects between the two countries are present.
5.1 Home ownership of multinational firms
We first analyze how our results for the benchmark loss offset scheme, as analyzed in
Section 3, are changed when each government’s objective function includes the profits
of the resident multinational.16 The analytically simplest case arises when the MNE’s
profits and tax revenues receive the same welfare weight in the government’s objective
function. There are, however, at least two reasons why governments will value tax
revenues more than the profits of home-based MNEs. A first reason is that public
goods must be financed by distortionary taxes, implying that one Euro of tax revenues
has a higher value for the government than one Euro of private income. Secondly,
MNEs are typically not fully owned by the residents of the country in which they are
headquartered.17
We capture this in our model by incorporating the profits of firm i into country i’s
government objective function with a weight of λ ≤ 1. National welfare in country i
then equals the weighted sum of the net-of-tax profits of firm i and country i’s tax
revenues. From the firm’s net profit equation (1) and tax revenues (6), we get
Wi = λE(pii) + Ti = [λ+ (1− λ)ti]Gi − [λ+ (1− λ)αti](1− p)ki + tip[f(kj)− kj]
+ λ(1− tj)p[f(ki)− ki] + [λtj + (1− λ)ti]qi − tiqj − λb
2
q2i ∀ i 6= j.
16Recall that the output price of the good produced by the two representative MNEs is fixed in the
world market. Consumer surplus is therefore unchanged throughout our analysis.
17Huizinga and Nicode`me (2006, Table 1), for example, derive a foreign ownership share of more
than 20%, on average, for a large sample of 15.000 European firms.
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Maximizing with respect to ti and using the firm’s first-order condition (2) and symme-
try implicitly defines country i’s optimal tax rate. Using the superscript W to indicate
variables under a welfare objective, country i’s optimal tax rate is given by
tWi =
BWi
−ΩWi
> 0, BWi =
{
(1− λ)[Gi − α(1− p)ki] + p[f(kj)− kj] + qi − qj + λtj ∂qi
∂ti
}
,
ΩWi = p
(
fkj − 1
) ∂kj
∂ti
− α(1− p)∂ki
∂ti
+ (1− λ)∂qi
∂ti
− ∂qj
∂ti
< 0. (26)
In the expression for tWi , the numerator B
W
i is a weighted sum of country i’s tax
base and the net profits of firm i and the denominator ΩWi has been signed using the
comparative static results in (4) and (5). To determine the change in tax rates following
an increase in the loss offset parameter α, the change in the numerator BWi is
∂BWi
∂α
= −(1− λ)
[
(1− p)ki + α(1− p) ∂ki
∂α
]
+ p(fk − 1)∂kj
∂α
. (27)
A simple benchmark case arises when λ = 1, implying that the profits of the home-based
MNE receive the same weight as tax revenues in the government’s welfare function. In
this case the first term in (27) is zero. Since the second term is unambiguously positive
from (10), the numerator in country i’s optimal tax rate is then rising in α, in contrast
to the analysis in Section 3. The intuition for this reversed sign is that the negative
direct effect of a higher loss offset parameter on country i’s tax revenues is matched
by an equal increase in the after-tax profits earned by the home-based MNE. With
λ = 1 these effects are fully offsetting so that there is no direct effect of the rise in
α on country i’s objective function. The indirect effect on investment, and hence on
expected profits, is positive, leading to a positive effect of an increase in α on optimal
tax rates via the change in BWi . Optimal tax rates will thus rise in response to increased
cross-border loss offset, if the effect of α on ΩWi in (26) is also positive. This is the case
when α is sufficiently low initially.18
As we have argued above, there are several reasons why setting λ < 1 may be a more
accurate description of most governments’ objective functions. In this more general
case, the first term in (27) is negative. In comparison to the benchmark case in Section 3
[see eq. (11)] it will, however, be diminished in size because the negative effect of α on
country i’s tax base is partly compensated by the higher net profits of the home-based
18Comparing (26) with the corresponding value in our benchmark analysis [eq. (8)], the only dif-
ference lies in the third term, which is independent of α. Hence the conditions for ∂ΩWi /∂α to be
positive are the same as in the benchmark case [see eq. (13)].
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firm. At the same time, the positive second effect is unchanged from our benchmark
analysis, because the accompanying profit loss is borne by the residents of the foreign
country j.19 This is sufficient to show that the optimal tax response to increased cross-
border loss compensation will no longer be unambiguously negative when firms’ profits
enter the government objective, even for α = 1. In particular, the tax base loss that
arises from the mechanical effect of the reform [the first part of the first effect in (27)]
matters less for tax policy under the generalized welfare objective, because the benefit
of higher rebates accrue to firms that are partly owned by domestic residents.
In practice, it is thus important to evaluate how large the relative profit weight λ is in
governments’ objective functions. Some authors argue that governments generally face
political pressures to increase corporate tax revenues, to counter accusations that tax
policy contributes to a widening income gap (see e.g. Sørensen, 2007).20 Moreover, since
most countries do not offer cross-border loss relief at present, governments have already
raised substantial concern about the revenue losses that this reform entails. Hence the
relative weight λ given to the profits of domestically owned firms may be fairly small for
the particular policy issue discussed here. If tax revenue considerations are dominant,
our benchmark analysis applies and introducing cross-border loss offset at the rate of
the MNE’s home country is likely to provide incentives for non-cooperating countries
to engage in more aggressive tax competition.
5.2 Endogenous risk choice of firms
As a second extension of our analysis for the benchmark loss offset scheme, we now let
the multinational firms choose the risk-return characteristics of their investments, as
given by the success probability pi. We postulate that, along the technological frontier,
there is an infinite number of investment projects that differ in their success probability,
where a riskier investment delivers a higher return in case of success.21 The production
function is then given by f(pi, ki) with first-order derivatives fk > 0 and fp < 0 and
second-order derivatives fkk < 0 and fpp ≤ 0. Furthermore risk taking (1 − pi) and
19This type of tax-exporting effect is familiar from the literature on international capital taxation.
See, for example, Huizinga and Nielsen (1997).
20Similarly, Rodrik (1998) presents empirical evidence that increased openness of a country, which
raises the volatility of incomes, leads to larger government expenditures and therefore to higher tax
revenue needs.
21See Haufler et al. (2012) for an analysis using this model element in a different policy setting.
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Figure 1: The firm’s optimal choice of project risk
-
6
p
pf(p)
p∗
capital investment ki are assumed to be complements, fkp < 0, implying that the safer
is an investment, the lower is the marginal return on capital. Otherwise the model is
unchanged from our analysis in Section 3.
In this extended setting, each MNE has three decision variables. The first-order con-
ditions for the investment level and the transfer price are unchanged from (2) and (3).
The additional first-order condition for the optimal choice of project risk is
f(pi, ki) + pifp(pi, ki) +
(tj − αti)
1− tj ki = 0 ∀ i 6= j. (28)
In the absence of taxes, the third term on the left-hand side is zero and the efficient
project choice is determined by the condition f(pi, ki) + pifp(pi, ki) = 0. For a risk-
neutral investor this first-order condition maximizes the expected return, pf(p), of the
project. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where p∗ is the efficient level of project risk.
Introducing taxes without a full cross-border loss offset leads to a positive third term
on the left-hand side of (28). Hence the negative second term must increase, implying
a larger value of pi and hence an inefficiently low level of project risk. In Figure 1
this corresponds to a project choice to the right of the efficient project p∗. Introducing
cross-border loss compensation will reduce this distortion, and it will fully eliminate it
when α = 1 and ti = tj.
The full analysis of the extended model is complex, and is relegated to the appendix.
It is straightforward, however, to summarize the results of this analysis, because the
effects of cross-border loss offset on risk-taking are in many ways parallel to those on
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the investment levels ki. A higher degree of loss compensation increases risk-taking (i.e.,
it reduces p) and thus the expected return from the investment. This effect increases
the (expected) tax base for both countries. At the same time, the expected tax rebates
paid to the home-based MNE rise for both countries, due to the higher risk of failure.
In a symmetric equilibrium where loss offset is almost complete (α→ 1), these effects
will just offset each other and only the negative mechanical effect of the reform remains
[see eq. (12)]. Hence, as in our analysis in Section 3, each country will have an incentive
to reduce its tax rate following a rise in α, if the level of cross-border loss compensation
is already high in the initial equilibrium.
Moreover, each country is again adversely affected by the tax reduction in the other
country. In the extended model, the negative effect that a decrease in country j’s tax
rate has on the tax base of country i is even reinforced through the endogenous choice of
a riskier project. A reduction of tj makes a risky investment more attractive for firm i,
and the costs of failure are partly borne by firm i’s home country via cross-border loss
compensation. Hence the parameter range under which an increase in α reduces tax
revenues in both countries is enlarged, relative to the benchmark case.22 Otherwise,
the results from Propositions 1a and 1b carry over in full to this model extension.
5.3 Asymmetric countries
Our analysis has so far focused on the case of symmetric countries. This is a suitable
benchmark case if one wants to find analytical solutions, but the practical implementa-
tion of a coordinated cross-border loss offset rule will almost always involve significant
asymmetries between countries. In this more realistic setting it becomes impracticable,
however, to derive analytical solutions for optimal tax adjustments and we therefore
present some representative simulation results in the following. As before (see Ta-
ble 1), we specify the production function of firm i as fi(ki) = φik
0.5
i . However, we now
introduce an exogenous asymmetry by allowing for differences in the productivity pa-
rameter φi between the two firms, with country 2 being the more productive location.
This productivity difference could, for example, arise from differences in the quality of
infrastructure in the two host countries. In particular we choose φ1 = 7 and φ2 = 5.
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22This is seen from the fact that the restriction on the level of tax rates in Proposition 1b is relaxed
in this extended setting. See eq. (A.18) in the appendix.
23Recall that the production function applies to the subsidiary of firm i, which produces in country j.
Hence a higher level of φ1 corresponds to a higher quality of infrastructure in country 2.
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Table 2: Cross-border loss compensation with asymmetric countries
benchmark scheme alternative scheme
α t1 t2 T1 T2 t1 t2 T1 T2
0.0 0.307 0.350 1.062 1.555 0.307 0.350 1.062 1.555
b = 0.2 0.5 0.278 0.335 0.894 1.431 0.341 0.393 1.030 1.709
0.9 0.230 0.300 0.661 1.188 0.389 0.457 0.965 1.931
0.0 0.495 0.529 1.427 2.199 0.495 0.529 1.427 2.199
b = 0.5 0.5 0.473 0.531 1.351 2.267 0.565 0.608 1.502 2.577
0.9 0.391 0.485 1.055 1.982 0.708 0.767 1.630 3.358
Notes: G1 = G2 = 1; φ1 = 7, φ2 = 5, p = 0.5
Table 2 presents our simulation results for the two different schemes of cross-border
loss offset, and for either low or moderate costs of profit shifting (b = 0.2 and b = 0.5,
respectively). In each scenario we compare the equilibria for no cross-border loss offset
(α = 0), an intermediate level of loss offset (α = 0.5), and the case where loss offset is
almost complete (α = 0.9).
The results in Table 2 show how the basic differences between the benchmark and the
alternative loss offset scheme interact with productivity differences between countries.
For the benchmark scheme, we know from Table 1 in Section 4 that tax rates will
generally (though not always) fall in both countries when α rises. At the same time,
the higher productivity of firms in country 2 leads to redistributive effects between the
two countries. Since the investment by (the subsidiary of) firm 1 is higher than that of
firm 2, country 1 has to grant the higher level of tax reliefs. Due to the combined effect
of more aggressive tax competition and redistributive losses, country 1 always loses tax
revenues when loss compensation is increased. In contrast, country 2 benefits from the
increased investment of firm 1, which raises its tax base and causes country 2 to set
a higher tax rate than country 1. Increased cross-border loss compensation therefore
has counteracting effects on country 2, simultaneously leading to more aggressive tax
competition and higher redistributive gains. When profit shifting costs are low (b =
0.2), the first effect dominates and country 2’s tax rate and its tax revenues fall. For
higher costs of profit shifting (b = 0.5), however, the redistributive gains dominate
for country 2. Accordingly, both its tax rate and its tax revenues rise, at least for
intermediate values of cross-border loss compensation.
24
Under the alternative loss offset scheme, the redistributive effects of productivity dif-
ferences between the two firms work in the same way as under the benchmark scheme.
However, as our theoretical analysis has shown, tax rates will always rise under the
alternative scheme (Proposition 2a). Hence there are now two counteracting effects of
a coordinated increase in α on the tax revenues in country 1. When profit-shifting
costs are low (b = 0.2) country 1 still loses from the expansion of cross-border loss
offset, but the revenue losses are far more limited than under the benchmark loss offset
scheme. When profit-shifting costs are higher (b = 0.5) country 1’s tax revenues will
even increase, as a result of less aggressive tax competition. For country 2, the revenue
gains from weaker tax competition and redistributive benefits are mutually reinforc-
ing. Hence country 2’s tax revenues increase in all scenarios, implying that the revenue
gains resulting from the changed investment and tax setting incentives dominate the
negative mechanical effect. In sum, therefore, the superiority of the alternative loss
offset scheme is maintained for revenue maximizing governments, when productivity
differences between countries are taken into account.
6 Conclusions
In its 2005 Marks and Spencer ruling, the European Court of Justice has established
the principle that the parent country of a multinational firm must allow cross-border
tax relief for the losses incurred by a subsidiary in a different EU member state, if the
losses incurred by the subsidiary are ‘final’. Given this ruling, it is very likely that EU
member states will be legally obliged to offer some form of cross-border loss offset in
the coming years, even though the exact conditions under which this occurs are not yet
clear. The critical question is then how to introduce cross-border loss offset in a way
that minimizes the negative side effects of this change for member states’ tax revenues.
In this paper we have analyzed two alternative schemes of introducing a coordinated
form of cross-border loss offset. Under the first, ‘benchmark’ scheme, each country
bases the tax rebate to loss-making subsidiaries of its domestic multinationals on its
own corporate tax rate. When this scheme is applied, a coordinated increase in cross-
border loss compensation reduces optimal tax rates, at least when the initial level of
cross-border tax relief is already high. In an environment where tax competition is an
important concern, as is the case in Europe, our analysis therefore warns that intro-
ducing cross-border loss compensation is likely to aggravate tax competition. These
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undesirable behavioral effects imply that the overall tax revenue losses accompanying
the introduction of cross-border tax relief are likely to be even larger than is implied
by the direct (mechanical) effect of the reform.
We also show that a simple change in the scheme of cross-border tax relief will suffice
to eliminate these undesirable side effects of the reform. All that is needed is to apply
the tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country, rather than the parent country’s home tax
rate, when calculating the tax rebate. In contrast to the benchmark setting, equilib-
rium taxes are likely to rise under the alternative loss offset scheme when cross-border
loss compensation is increased. As a consequence, tax revenue losses will be lower than
is implied by the direct effect of the reform. Moreover, this scheme will comply with
the legal requirement that the tax treatment of losses does not discriminate between
nationally versus multinationally operating corporate groups, and it will also exhibit
the efficiency-enhancing effects on firms’ investment and risk-taking decisions that rep-
resents the core advantage of loss compensation. Therefore, if cross-border loss offset
is to be introduced for either legal or economic reasons, our results suggest that tax re-
bates should be based on the tax rate in the country where the loss-making subsidiary
operates.
Our analysis can be extended in several ways. A first extension would be to introduce
an intertemporal model of investment and cross-border loss compensation. This would
allow, for example, to distinguish between a temporary and a permanent transfer of
losses from the subsidiary to the parent country, or to capture loss carryforward pro-
visions in the host country that are limited in time. We believe, however, that adding
these realistic features would not overturn the qualitative conclusions of our analysis
with respect to the ranking of the alternative loss offset regimes. A second, and more
fundamental, extension would be to endogenize the location decisions of multinational
firms, which have been taken as given in the present analysis. In such a setting, the
elasticity with which the location decision of subsidaries responds to international tax
differentials should be lower under the alternative loss offset scheme, because higher
tax rates would then also carry the advantage of a higher rate of loss offset. Hence we
would expect that, like in the present analysis, tax competition is less aggressive under
the alternative scheme than under the benchmark scheme of loss offset. A full analysis
of this case must, however, be left for future research.
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Appendix
The model with endogenous risk choice by firms
To study the comparative static effects of taxes in this model, we totally differentiate
the first-order conditions (2), (3) and (28) in the main text. This leads to the following
equation set:
(1− tj)pifkikidki + [(1− tj)(fki − 1 + pifkipi) + 1− αti]dpi
+ α(1− pi)dti − pi(fki − 1)dtj = 0 (A.1)
[(1− tj)(fki − 1 + pifkipi) + 1− αti]dki + (1− tj)(2fpi + pifpipi)dpi
− αkidti − [f(pi, ki)− ki + pifpi ]dtj = 0 (A.2)
dqi +
1
b
dti − 1
b
dtj = 0 (A.3)
In matrix notation this yields
γ1 γ2 0
γ2 γ3 0
0 0 1
×

dki
dpi
dqi
 =

γ4
γ5
γ8
 dtj +

γ6
γ7
−γ8
 dti, (A.4)
where
γ1 = (1− tj)pifkiki < 0, γ2 = (1− tj)[fki − 1 + pifkipi ] + 1− αti
γ3 = (1− tj)(2fpi + pifpipi) < 0, γ4 = pi(fki − 1) ≥ 0
γ5 = f(pi, ki) + pifpi − ki < 0, γ6 = −α(1− pi) ≤ 0
γ7 = αki ≥ 0, γ8 = 1/b > 0 (A.5)
In (A.5), the signs of γ1 and γ3 follow directly from the properties of the production
function f(ki, pi). The signs of γ4 and γ5 follow from the first-order conditions (2)
and (28). The signs of γ6 and γ7 can be unambiguously signed for α > 0 but are both
equal to zero when α = 0. Moreover, γ8 > 0 by assumption. What remains then is to
sign γ2. We assume in the following that the complementarity between investment and
risk-taking, leading to fki,pi < 0, is sufficiently strong to make γ2 negative. This is a
sufficient, but not a necessary condition to unambiguously sign the comparative static
effects that follow.
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Applying Cramer’s rule to the equation system (A.4) and using these assumptions, the
effects of taxes on investment levels and risk choices in each country can be signed as:
dki
dtj
=
γ3γ4 − γ2γ5
γ1γ3 − γ22 < 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, (A.6)
dpi
dtj
=
γ1γ5 − γ2γ4
γ1γ3 − γ22 > 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, (A.7)
dqi
dtj
= γ8 > 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, (A.8)
dki
dti
=
γ3γ6 − γ2γ7
γ1γ3 − γ22 > 0 ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (A.9)
dpi
dti
=
γ1γ7 − γ2γ6
γ1γ3 − γ22 < 0 ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. (A.10)
dqi
dti
= −γ8 < 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. (A.11)
Equations (A.6)–(A.11) show that an increase in country j’s tax rate leads to less
capital investment and less risk-taking by the subsidiary of firm i. In contrast, by
increasing the expected tax rebate, an increase in the tax rate of the other country i
increases both capital investment and risk-taking by firm i’s subsidiary when the loss
offset parameter α is strictly positive. In addition to these direct effects, there are
indirect effects caused by the complementarity of capital ki and risk-taking (1 − pi).
Under the assumptions made above, these indirect effects reinforce the direct effects.
The two governments maximize tax revenues. The tax revenues of government i are:
Tˆi = ti{Gi − α(1− pi)ki + pj[f(pj, kj)− kj] + (qi − qj)} ∀ i. (A.12)
Maximizing with respect to ti gives country i’s optimal tax rate in implicit form:
tˆ∗i =
Bˆi
−Ωˆi
> 0, Bˆi = Gi − α(1− pi)ki + pj[f(pj, kj)− kj] + (qi − qj),
Ωˆi =
[
γ4
dkj
dti
+ γ5
dpj
dti
+ γ6
dki
dti
+ γ7
dpi
dti
+
dqi
dti
− dqj
dti
]
< 0. (A.13)
Note that endogenizing the firms’ risk choice increases the sensitivity of country i’s tax
base with respect to its own tax rate, as compared to the benchmark model.
We can now analyze the effects of cross-border loss offset on optimal tax rates in the
extended model, following eq. (9). The impact effect of a rise in α on investment is
positive, whereas the impact effect on pi is negative:
∂ki
∂α
= −ti(1− pi)
γ1
> 0,
∂pi
∂α
=
tjki
γ3
< 0 ∀ i. (A.14)
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The change in country i’s tax base following an increase in α is then given by
∂Bˆi
∂α
= −(1− pi)ki + γ4∂kj
∂α
+ γ6
∂ki
∂α
+ γ5
∂pj
∂α
+ γ7
∂pi
∂α
. (A.15)
Using (10) and (A.4) to sign these effects, the interpretation of the first three effects is
analogous to eq. (11). The last two effects on the right-hand side of (A.15) arise from
the changes in the two firms’ risk-taking behavior. The fourth effect is positive as a
higher level of risk-taking by firm j increases the expected tax revenues for country i,
which does not rebate firm j in case of project failure. In contrast, the fifth effect is
negative as more risk-taking by firm i’s subsidiary increases the expected tax rebate
granted by country i.
As in the benchmark model, the net effect can only be signed when cross-border loss
offset is almost complete (α→ 1) and countries are symmetric. In this case all indirect
effects operating through induced changes in ki and pi cancel out, leaving only the
negative direct effect of α. In this case the tax base change thus corresponds to (12).
The effects of a change in α on the denominator of the optimal tax rule (A.13) are also
ambiguous, in general. Differentiating (A.18) yields
∂Ωˆi
∂α
=
∂γ4
∂α
dkj
dti
+
∂γ5
∂α
dpj
dti
+
∂γ6
∂α
dki
dti
+
∂γ7
∂α
dpi
dti
+ γ4
∂(dkj/dti)
∂α
+
γ5
∂(dpj/dti)
∂α
+ γ6
∂(dki/dti)
∂α
+ γ7
∂(dpi/dti)
∂α
(A.16)
For α → 1, however, this expression can be unambiguously signed. Evaluating (A.16)
at α = 1 and using γ4|α=1 = (1 − pi), γ5|α=1 = −ki, γ6|α=1 = −(1 − pi), γ7|α=1 = ki
and the symmetry condition ti = tj gives
∂Ωˆi
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
= −4tiγ2
N2
{[(1− pi)γ3 + kiγ2] + [kiγ1 + (1− pi)γ2]}+
(1− pi)γ3 + kiγ2
N
[
2− 3tj
1− tj (1− pi) +
(γ2 + 1− tj)tjki
(1− tj)γ3
]
+
kiγ1 + (1− pi)γ2
N
[
2− 3tj
1− tj ki +
(γ2 + 1− tj)tj(1− pi)
(1− tj)γ1
]
(A.17)
A sufficient condition for the terms in squared brackets, and therefore for the entire
derivative, to be negative is that tj ≤ 2/3. Hence we get:
dΩˆi
dα
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
< 0 ⇔ t ≤ 2
3
. (A.18)
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Thus the elasticity of country i’s tax base increases for a small increase in α when loss
offset is almost complete and the tax rate is not too high in the initial equilibrium.
In comparison to the benchmark model [eq. (13)] the range of tax rates for which this
result obtains is thus enlarged, due to the endogenous risk choice of the two firms.
Lastly, we analyze the change in equilibrium tax revenues following an increase in α.
The direct effect on the tax base is given in (A.15) and has been shown to be negative
for α→ 1. For the tax externality we get
∂Tˆi
∂tj
= ti
[
γ4
dkj
dtj
+ γ5
dpj
dtj
+ γ6
dki
dtj
+ γ7
dpi
dtj
+
dqi
dtj
− dqj
dtj
]
> 0. (A.19)
From (A.19), a rise in the foreign tax rate tj unambiguously raises tax revenues in
country i. By increasing the expected reimbursement for subsidiary j, the tax increase
will lead firm j to invest more, thus augmenting the tax base of country i. Likewise,
country i’s tax base is expanded by a higher risk level chosen by the subsidiary of firm j,
which increases expected profits. At the same time, investment and risk-taking by the
subsidiary if firm i are discouraged, reducing the expected tax rebates that have to be
paid by country i’s government. Since a rise in α reduces equilibrium tax rates in both
countries when loss offset is almost complete, the indirect effect of a change in α on tax
revenues is negative for α → 1. Hence all the qualitative results from Propositions 1a
and 1b carry over to an extended model where the risk-taking choices of the two MNEs
are endogenized.
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